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TAKING JURY VERDICTS SERIOUSLY
Steven Alan Childress*

URORS may not know it, but they live in a fishbowl. To be sure,
they probably think they do, in the sense that they notice people
watching them in the courtroom. Yet they likely do not perceive
how much their decision-making process or product-before, after, and
outside of trial-is scrutinized by others, including many people they
never meet. Elaborate pre-trial procedures and motions, plus rules of
evidence applied in limine or during trial, filter this process. Next, midtrial and post-trial motions for new trial and judgment as a matter of law
seek to overturn their decision, actual or potential (depending on important rules of timing).' Much of the trial battle is engaged without a jury
around, but it is usually about the jury anyway.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in two cases last year, focused
on one aspect of this filtering and control system in civil cases: judgment2
as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the first case, Weisgram v. Marley Co.,3 the Court warned that the appellate court on review does not consider evidence decidedly in the record, which should not be there because it was erroneously admitted in
the first place. Many courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, had limited their appellate relief in such situations to ordering a new trial, not directing the entry of judgment-or even had reviewed the record intact, including the stray evidence. 4 Instead, the
Weisgram Court reaffirmed appellate authority to direct entry of judg* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. B.A., University of Alabama; J.D., Harvard
Law School; M.A., Ph.D. (Jurisprudence & Social Policy), University of California at
Berkeley.
1. See generally Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens Inc., 216 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing timing and preservation rules in appeals of motions made during trial); 1 STEVEN
ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW §§ 3.13-3.15
(3d ed. 1999) (discussing trial and post-trial motions for relief from a jury verdict and their
intricate requirements of proper timing and preservation of error). Although improper
preservation of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue may lead to waiver, careful litigants
recognize that there is no reason to depend on the kindness of strangers in the appellate
court if the sufficiency challenge is properly made and timed below. See id., § 3.16, at 11923.
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a), as amended in 1991. The rule formerly termed such motions
as ones for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Now both such motions are properly termed as seeking judgment as a matter of law whether brought during
trial or after.
3. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985); Sumitomo
Bank v. Prod. Promotions, Inc., 717 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1983); Midcontinent Broad. Co.
v. N. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 471 F.2d 357, 358 (8th Cir. 1973).
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ment as a matter of law, albeit on review that considers the record minus
the improperly admitted evidence. 5 The question is whether the remaining and proper evidence suffices to constitute a submissible case. 6 The
7
opinion resolved a circuit conflict on this unusual situation.
The second case dealt with an even more fundamental issue of jury
review: whether appellate review is made on the whole record developed
at trial, or is applied only to that part of the record that supports the
jury's finding. The case may be known more for its impact on employment discrimination cases, yet it actually carried a far broader message, as
Professor Dorsaneo's article thoughtfully observes. 8 In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,9 the Court arguably rejected some circuits'
use under Rule 50(a) of a one-side-only perspective while reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a civil jury verdict. I write "arguably" because Professor Dorsaneo disagrees with an interpretation of
Reeves, by me and some other sources,' 0 that concludes that the Court
has indeed adopted whole-record review on appeal of civil jury verdicts.
There is no dispute that the Reeves Court explicitly reviewed the broad
issue of what body of evidence the federal circuit court should use in
performing its review function. Earlier Supreme Court precedent, which
had seemed to review only the evidence supporting the verdict, was
found to create less inconsistency with later whole-record language than
one might think: "[o]n closer examination, this conflict seems more semantic than real."' 1 Citing recent summary judgment cases and its "mir5. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 453-56.
6. Id. at 457. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the appellate court still
exercises its recognized discretion to remand for a new trial rather than direct entry of
judgment. The Weisgram rule would seem unfair, for example, where a plaintiff reasonably
relied on the admission of evidence in resting its case and it is clear, even on appeal, that
bolstering evidence would have been forthcoming at trial. However, reliance alone is not
enough to defeat the appellate authority to conclude that the excised record requires judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 454-55. In this case, the Eighth Circuit did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to direct the entry of judgment rather than remanding for a new trial
or further proceedings. Id. at 456.
7. See id. at 446 & n.2 (describing circuit split and noting Court granted certiorari to
resolve it).
8. See generally William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54
SMU L. REV. 1695 (2001) (discussing vital importance of Reexamination Clause and general issue of jury review, as well as serious recent attention by Court itself).
9. 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (majority opinion of O'Connor, J.). The Court specifically
granted certiorarito address the circuit split about the proper Rule 50 standard of review
to be applied to employment discrimination cases based on "pretext." Id. at 140-41. Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, apparently agreed with the majority's generalized civil review rule (making it unanimous) but clarified her view of the discrimination
burden-shifting procedure. See id. at 154-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
10. See Dorsaneo, supra note 8, at 1695 & n.40 (citing academic [mis]readings of
Reeves).
It. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. The Court found that Wilkerson and like cases-which
had said that "in passing upon" the jury issue "we need look only to the evidence and
reasonable inferences which tend to support" the verdict-have been clarified to simply
"refer[ ] to the evidence to which the trial court should give credence, not the evidence that
the court should review." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations to Wilkerson v. McCarthy,
336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949) omitted). While this technical reading of older cases is a stretchthe Court's policy then usually favored a hands-off approach to juries in tort cases-a
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rored" status to Rule 50 jury motions, the Court stated: "It therefore
follows that, in entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
court should review all of the evidence in the record. ' 12 Obviously, I stop
there and conclude that a general whole-record approach, as followed
previously in the majority of courts and exemplified in the Boeing decision from the Fifth Circuit, 13 is now settled law on review of jury verdicts
just as it is applied in deciding or reviewing a summary judgment motion. 14 Ultimately, the approach was found to apply to employment discrimination cases involving allegations of employer "pretext," and was
improperly applied by the Fifth Circuit in the Reeves case itself, requiring
5
reversal on its facts.'
If the Court had stopped there, we would all agree that the rule of
whole-record review is settled, unwavering, and unqualified. I wish that
the Court had, and I find its further foray into fact-finding-relied upon
heavily by Professor Dorsaneo and discussed further below-to be puzzling and problematic. Indeed, I had already criticized the Court for
short-shifting the entire issue and failing to dig into a coherent rationale
for the standard it apparently adopted.1 6 If it had explained its rationale,
I concluded, the Court could have more fully justified its adoption of
whole-record review, just as it previously had in the contexts of adminiswhole-record rule is certainly consistent with recent cases on summary judgment, the
amended Rule 50, and language from other Court opinions. Indeed, most courts and commentators had read Wilkerson as limited to the FELA or Jones Act context, though apparently this Court wanted to avoid confirming its application in such cases and did not use
that distinction. See generally CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 3.07, at 51-52.
12. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150.
13. See id. at 149-50 (citing and apparently endorsing Boeing for its rule "that review
extends to the entire record"). The Fifth Circuit's flagship whole-record review case is the
oft-cited opinion in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (since
then, partly overturned on other [application to maritime cases at trial] grounds).
14. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (the whole-record standard for summary judgment
"mirrors" that under Rule 50, so "[it therefore follows that, in entertaining a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record")
(emphasis added). See also Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury,
87 VA. L. REV. 587, 699 n.441 (2001) (historical and policy examination of jury decisionmaking and control devices notes, parenthetically, that Reeves is "applying whole-record
approach in a federal question case").
15. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-54. The larger circuit split was mainly about the application of whole-record review in such discrimination cases, since many courts (including the
Fifth Circuit) that use whole-record review had trouble applying it-or found it applied
differently-to "pretext" cases in light of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993). After setting out its Rule 50 review rule, the Reeves Court found that the Fifth
Circuit misapplied it to the facts: "Applying this standard here, it is apparent that respondent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. The Fifth
Circuit's decision entering judgment for the employer was reversed.
16. Steven Alan Childress, Jury Verdicts: The Whole Greater Than Pieces, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1539, 1543 (2000) (arguing that Reeves rightly imposed whole-record review but did
not offer sufficient explanation). I noted that Professor Dorsaneo had given much more
careful attention to the review issue and policies than had the Supreme Court. See id. at
1543-44 (citing William V. Dorsaneo, II, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1497 (2000)). 1 am even more convinced of that assessment given the ambiguity
understandably engendered by Justice O'Connor's opinion.
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trative law, criminal appeals, and civil bench-trial review. 17
But wait. There's more. (Appellate court operators are standing by.)
The Reeves Court, admittedly, did not stop there. It reiterated that in
applying whole-record review, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.' 8 Such language by itself is not
confusing; indeed, it is standard fare in a variety of Supreme Court and
circuit court cases 19 and an important reminder that jury review is severely limited. However, the Court then added that, although the reviewer's eye is on the entire body of evidence,
it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the
jury is not required to believe. . . .That is, the court should give
credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that "evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and
unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from
'20
disinterested witnesses.
Such language, borrowed from the classic Wright and Miller treatise, is
thus presented as an application of, not a departure from, the whole-re2
cord rule. '
Admittedly, such additional language is less than clear when compared
to its earlier, more forceful statement of "all of the evidence" review. It
allows one to argue, as Professor Dorsaneo does, that it truly qualifies
and changes what would otherwise be an unrelenting whole-record rule.
Nevertheless, I argue that the Court meant for this language to be, at
most, one application of its broader whole-record rule rather than a true
limitation on it.
The language is curious on several levels. First,it simply may be inconsistent with a firm whole-record rule. Professor Dorsaneo provides a detailed analysis of how such language, essentially, cannot coexist with a
true whole-record rule.22 He then takes the language very seriously, as
the opinion's "most critical language. '23 Yet even if the language should
17. See Childress, supra note 16, at 1543-44. My policy and precedential arguments in
favor of a whole-record rule are summarized in the previous Commentary, which particularly explores themes of symmetrical decision-making (the jury viewed the whole record,
so should reviewers) and overwhelming evidence (a scintilla of evidence may be unreasonable when swamped by contrary evidence). See id. at 1541-42. They are not repeated here.
This Commentary instead considers whether the Reeves opinion requires the approach suggested by Professor Dorsaneo or, rather, a more universal whole-record rule as I originally
claimed.
18. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150.
19. See generally CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 3.02, at 10 (collecting cases).
20. Id. at 151 (citing 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2529, at 299, 300 (2d ed. 1995)).
21. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 ("although the court should review the record as a
whole, it must disregard..."). Likewise, its caution to draw inferences in favor of the
verdict winner is explicitly an application of whole-record review. See id. at 150 ("[i]n
doing so"-i.e., in "review[ing] all of the evidence"-the "court must draw" inferences
favoring the jury's finding and avoid weighing the evidence or assessing credibility).
22. See Dorsanco, supra note 8, at 1702.

23. Id.
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theoretically work out differently in some cases (and thus the Court
should have been more careful and realized it was speaking somewhat in
two voices), it is not clear at all that the language is fatally inconsistent in
most actual review situations. It could be read (and should be, I add) as a
more forceful reminder of the prohibition against revisiting credibility
calls; it is then an example of the kind of situation in which applying
whole-record review remains highly deferential to the jury's resolution of
true factual disputes. The Court may be merely, but not clearly, stating
that "contradicted" testimony is by definition a conflict in credibility to be
resolved for the nonmovant verdict-winner-without meaning to hold
that the movant can only win with disinterested witnesses.
One could then say that any inconsistency, not realized by the Court,
must be resolved in favor of its clear direction to review "all of the evidence." One could say that it adds unhelpful or unclear dicta, to be totally ignored. But I need not say that. I argue that the quotation from
Wright and Miller acts, at most, as a caution for a certain type of case
involving special problems of credibility rather than a general modification of the whole-record rule. The usual case, then, should apply wholerecord review realistically without qualification or reference to the added
language. I thus take the language seriously as far it goes, for the kind of
appeal that comes down to credibility calls. It still leaves intact, for me, a
generic statement that the Court has adopted whole-record review. This
view therefore denies that it is the critical language in this opinion, even if
it seems inconsistent in some contexts with the general whole-record
mandate.
Second, it is the kind of cautionary language about disinterested witnesses and uncontradicted evidence that is often cited in Second Circuit
decisions. 24 Such lower court cases, then, could be cast as creating a distinct "middle-ground approach" between whole-record review and oneside-only review.2 5 But the Reeves Court offers such language from the
treatise rather than from any of the Second Circuit cases which openly
use it to limit review. Justice O'Connor's opinion never mentions that the
24. E.g., Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1974); Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 5 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970). The First and Third Circuits have also presented such
language in their jury review rules. Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1981);
Inventive Music, Ltd. v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980). But for the First Circuit, it
may sometimes be a rule that favors the movant rather than a limit on review: the court is
warned that it cannot ignore uncontradicted evidence offered by the movant. See Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 445 (1st Cir. 1989). Even in the Second Circuit,
the rule may have evolved into one of whole-record review plus a reminder to look to
uncontradicted evidence. See Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 572 F.2d
953, 956 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Boeing). Yet some cases simply recite whole-record review.
See Epoch Prod. Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 742-43 (2d Cir. 1975) (entire
record), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
25. For example, that is how this position was described by Justice White, in cataloging
a three-way circuit conflict on this issue and urging the Court to address it. See Schwimmer
v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). See generally
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 3.03, at 27-28 (collecting cases on circuit conflict and
characterization of Second Circuit approach). Reeves addressed the issue, finally, but not
as a three-way split.
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circuit split has traditionally been seen to include any compromise position, notably omitting the Second Circuit's rule.
This is curious if the Court meant to adopt it as a serious compromise
approach. The fact that it borrowed from a treatise rather than circuit
law implies, to me, that it-most likely-simply failed to recognize the
circuit split and the Second Circuit rule (i.e., that it unwittingly used potentially inconsistent language, as argued above). Or, possibly, that it
considered the Second Circuit as a separate approach and rejected it. Either way, the whole-record rule goes fundamentally unaltered and at
most is garnished by some additional language from academics cautioning
care in application-not a blatant adoption of a lower court position that
takes the language so seriously as to make it circuit law.
This is especially true to the extent that the middle-ground approach is
seen as only an academic debate, rather than a circuit option from which
to choose. To the extent the Court cites scholars and ignores cases for
much the same point, it may be signaling its recognition that the language
warns against weighing evidence but does not state a distinct review analysis. This view is bolstered by noting that Wright and Miller themselves,
in other places, do not consistently present their qualifying language
of
"uncontradicted evidence" as denying a general whole-record rule.26 It
could be said, then, that the Court's cited source itself does not own up to
the potential inconsistency between its suggested language and the more
general rejection of any evidence standard to test a jury's finding. It is
hardly a bedrock of academic support for the one selected position on
which the Court quotes it.
Third, it is curious that the Court reduces to a mere "semantic" ploy a
review rule that is applied in many older cases falling under the protective statutory schemes of the FELA or Jones Act. 27 Rather than simply
distinguishing the one-side-only precedent as limited to such statutory review, the Court appears to make a universal whole-record rule. If so, it
may fundamentally change the way such statutory cases are reviewed in
the future; their jurisprudential basis for stricter review may now reduce
to a semantic misunderstanding and be cast as consistent with whole-record, not extremely deferential, review.
Although Professor Dorsaneo sees this distinction as causing some of
the misreadings of Reeves he finds, 28 I read it as expressing or foreshadowing the Court's new skepticism of that line of precedent, with its case26. Compare

CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 95,

at

685-86

(5th ed. 1994) (apparently endorses using the FELA test generally and cites cases so using
it), with 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2524, at 252-54, 266 (2d ed. 1995) (rule requiring affirmance if any evidence
supports the verdict is not, and should not be, followed), and § 2529, at 299-300 (reciting
and recommending "uncontradicted" qualification from Simblest and other Second Circuit
cases).
27. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 ("On closer examination, this conflict seems more semantic than real."), discussed supra note 11.
28. See Dorsaneo, supra note 8, at 1703 (noting confusion stems from the "semantic"
point).
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law tradition of "slight negligence. '2 9 Certainly lower courts and state
cases are beginning to re-think and reject the lower "slight negligence"
burden, placed on statutorily covered tort victims, which seemed to apply
from the older Supreme Court cases. 30 Indeed, Reeves may be the signal
that the Supreme Court itself (understandably of concern, perhaps, to
Professor Dorsaneo) will revisit and ultimately reject the Jones Act and
FELA tradition of difference. At the least, the Court's wavering on the
strength of traditional FELA-type review may mean that that there is an
open question whether one-side-only review survives in such contexts. 31
Perhaps the Justices just want to avoid the issue, as it percolates in lower
courts, for now. Nevertheless, it is a doubtful indication that any form of
one-side-only review is to be borrowed from those schemes into the general civil jury review.
Fourth, the Court's added language is curious in that it is apparently
unnecessary to its ultimate reversal of the Fifth Circuit's decision. 32 The
actual application of this review performed on the facts in Reeves belies a
general rule that the appellate review can only consider those pieces of
the evidence which support the verdict or, if otherwise, are uncontroverted. Instead, the Court appears to sift through "all of the evidence" in
the record, or at least both sides of it, as foreshadowed in its summary of
the standard. At bottom, the qualifying language-if not simply dictadoes not seem "critical" in its application to the actual case under review.
Fifth, to the extent that the Court's added language relates to this employment case's facts at all, it harkens back to the opinion's introductory
discussion about inferring a fact from a disbelief in the witness presenting
it-a quite different issue from whole-record review. Without reconciling
or discussing its apparent contrary position in other cases, 33 Justice
29. See generally CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 3.07, at 52-55 (examining Jones
Act/FELA tradition of affirming plaintiff verdicts on "slight negligence" as well as recent
developments in lower courts reexamining that test).
30. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) and Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co., 725 So. 2d 474 (La. 1999), cert. denied,
527 U.S. 1023 (1999) (both rejecting slight negligence).
31. The Court may have (unwittingly, perhaps) called into question this strict review
application in such federal protection cases. The Court discusses Wilkerson v. McCarthy
and like one-side-only cases without noting or distinguishing (and thus retaining) their special status as falling under the FELA or Jones Act. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. It can be
argued that the easier rationale for Reeves would have been simply to distinguish (as many
courts and commentators do) the older strict cases as limited to their statutory context. In
so doing, the Court would have reaffirmed the strict standard in such cases. By not doing
so, the Court leaves open the argument that the distinction no longer holds and that Wilkerson must be read more into line with modern whole-record review in non-statutory
contexts (generating one general federal standard).
32. See, e.g., Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-54 (applying standard of review to facts of case
and finding that the Fifth Circuit erred in ignoring disputed evidence). Specifically, the
lower court "disregarded critical evidence favorable to" the nonmovant, rather than any
assessment of the movant's disinterested witnesses or uncontradicted testimony. See id. at
152.
33. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986) (stating in jury
[summary judgment] context that one generally cannot draw a contrary conclusion merely
from discredited testimony); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S.
485, 512 (1984) (stating same, in context of bench trial review of factfindings).
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O'Connor stated, on jury review:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the [firing] explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is
consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the fact
finder is entitled to consider a party's'34dishonesty about a material
fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt."
On the facts of the case, such an inference helped the Court to conclude that the plaintiff had record evidence, including the reality itself
that the defendant's offered explanation was pretextual, to support a verdict finding discrimination. 35 At any rate, the additional review language
may fit more naturally into the difficult area of what kind of inference a
fact finder may affirmatively make from the disbelief of a witness, rather
than as some general restriction on the amount and body of evidence
within the review scope.
Sixth, an interpretation of Reeves that overvalues its add-on language
would underplay the reality that the recent Supreme Court has a reputation for cutting back the jury trial right and for increasingly empowering
the appellate review of juries, as Professor Dorsaneo apparently recognizes and understandably laments. 36 In his cited area of summary judgment, for example, there is no doubt that the Court in 1986 sent a
powerful message of structural change away from jury decision-making
and toward pre-trial dispute resolution by federal district judges. 37 This
trend may not constitute a virulent disdain for the civil jury, but it is an
unlikely foundation on which to believe that the Reeves Court meant to
re-empower the jury through some version of one-side-only deference.
Even less likely does it, in turn, alter the summary judgment standard
away from the whole-record rule undeniably established in that context
34. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (quoting the habeas case of Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,
296 (1992)). The Court added that discrimination may then be the most likely inference.
See id. at 147-148.
35. Id. at 153.
36. See, e.g., Dorsaneo, supra note 8, at 1697 & n.10 (jury right is recognized as being
endangered by some recent developments), 1730 (discussing the de novo review recently
given a finding on the constitutionality of punitive damages). In many other areas of the
modern civil jury-including the expansion of pre-trial practice, the growing requirement
of mandatory arbitration in commercial and employment cases, recent limitations on admitting scientific evidence, the definition of what patent issues are "law" not for the jury,
and the empowering of appellate discretion as reaffirmed in Weisgram-this Court cannot
fairly be predicted to bolster the protection of jury findings. Indeed, that usurpative trend
has probably evolved over a long time span. See generally Margaret L. Moses, What the
Jury Must Hear: the Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence,68 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 183 (2000) (noting some ways in which jury rights have been restricted over
time); Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33 (juries have lost power via formal jury control devices). Cf. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 14 (examining the judge/jury issue in federal courts and their
application when state interests arise, but disputing the usual views of modern judges and
scholars that the power of the jury has diminished over an extended time).
37. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court'sShimmering
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 95 (1988); Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at
the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987).
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fifteen years ago. 38
Finally, in the "early returns," the Fifth Circuit apparently read Reeves
as supporting its traditional whole-record review. 39 That Court's additional language is quoted, but merely as "principles for courts to follow in
reviewing all of the evidence in the record."'40 This citation does not deny
the strength of Professor Dorsaneo's analysis, of course, because any such
case could simply be based on the misreading he perceives and the underappreciation of the qualifying Reeves language that he criticizes. Nevertheless, it at least illustrates, along with the more general trend in the
Supreme Court away from strict deference to the jury (as on punitive
damages), that the reading of Reeves he provides is something of an exercise in understandable, but wishful, thinking.
These various curiosities, in total, make it an arguable inference that
the Supreme Court meant much of significance by adding a quotation
from Wright and Miller that is itself of questionable consistency with the
stated whole-record standard, with the case's facts as resolved, and with
perhaps their treatise itself. The Court does take jury verdicts seriously,
as it should, and demonstrates that to us by reversing the Fifth Circuit's
intrusive application. Yet perhaps not all of the opinion's language should
be taken so strictly. In sum, Professor Dorsaneo and I differ both in the
faith with which we accord the Reeves Court's purpose, as well as in how
literally we would read its undeniable but awkward language applying the
stated jury test.
The bottom line appears, to me, to be a review for reasonableness of
the jury's decision: one that requires the appellate court to credit the witnesses and reasonable inferences favoring the verdict but one that is not
limited exclusively to reviewing only that evidence-or even only that
evidence plus unimpeached contrary evidence. By this view, the "middleground" tradition of some courts is rejected, as is the acknowledged oneside-only approach; a general whole-record review is endorsed, despite
the puzzling language added. Review does assume the evidence and its
inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, but that test
applies to the record viewed in its entirety.

38. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (drawing on "the analogous context of summary judgment," where review is "taken as a whole"). This application of the "mirror" of summary
judgment makes it unlikely, to me, that the Court will then use Reeves to revisit the hardfought terrain of summary judgment law.
39. Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 527 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2001) (Reeves
"conclude[s]," in a standard that "closely resembles" that of Boeing, that "the court should
review all of the evidence in the record").
40. Id. at 527.
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